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PERSPECTIVE
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I. INTRODUCTION
RECENTLY THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANT discussions regarding
dispute resolution mechanisms. Much of the discussion has been spurred
by the advent of the World Trade Organization's Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (Understanding).'
Discussion originally abounded regarding the dispute resolution
mechanism established by the Understanding and how it appeared to
differ from GATT (1947) procedures. 2 Discussion has now turned to the
actual application of the Understanding as cases are being heard in
Geneva. In North America, dispute resolution has been a prominent issue
since the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement. The controversy
surrounding the Free Trade Agreement dispute resolution mechanisms has
around Chapter 19. Chapter 19 allows for the establishment of binational
panels to review administrative decisions in anti-dumping and countervailing duty cases. The panels replace judicial review of agency determinations.
The Chapter 19 dispute resolution mechanism has been closely
watched because of its innovative approach and its important place in the
settlement of U.S. and Canadian trade disputes. Although the mechanism
has been criticized, it has also been hailed by many as a unique and
positive step in the area of trade disputes. The mechanism has generally
been evaluated in isolation. It is unique among bilateral trade agreements
and is superior to the consensus approach of GATT (1947). However,
now that the GATT dispute resolution mechanism has taken such a
dramatic step forward with the WTO dispute resolution mechanism, it is
time to re-evaluate what was the Free Trade Agreement, and what is now
the NAFTA dispute resolution mechanism.
This Article compares and contrasts the Chapter 19 process with the
WTO dispute resolution mechanism to determine which mechanism
Canada and its industries should rely upon in particular circumstances.
Admittedly, the mechanisms differ in fundamental ways, and because of
this the analysis will not lead to a decision about which is the "better" of

' Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, April 15, 1994, 1 Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round
(1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1140 (1994) (including the World Trade Organization's
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes) [hereinaf-

ter Understanding].
2 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 188 [hereinafter GATT (1947)]. The pre-Uruguay Round GATT Dispute
Resolution Mechanism evolved significantly between 1947 and the end of the Round.
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the two. The analysis does not give preference to one particular mechanism. Instead, it is more concerned with how the two systems can coexist. Although each mechanism has a different focus, they overlap in some
key respects. Therefore, anti-dumping and countervailing duty disputes
must be approached in the context of both mechanisms. While the
mechanisms are not alternatives to each another, they can be compared to
evaluate their relative effectiveness.
Perhaps the key distinction between the two mechanisms is that
Chapter 19 focuses on administrative decisions while the WTO mechanism examines national implementing legislation to determine if its
decisions are in accord with WTO obligations. Generally speaking, the
former looks at procedure while the latter is concerned with substance.
Another key difference is that while only governments can initiate the
WTO mechanism, Chapter 19 enables private industry to challenge
government action.
This Article first analyzes Chapter 19. It then shifts focus to the
WTO dispute resolution mechanism. The Article concludes with an
analysis of both mechanisms. The Article also summarizes the negotiating
goals and history of Canada and the United States which resulted in the
respective mechanisms and analyzes them in terms of their substantive,
procedural, and enforcement provisions. Each of the two main parts
concludes with an analysis of how the mechanisms will operate and
function in the future. The Article ends with an analysis of how the
mechanisms can best be used by Canadian industries and suggests possible future developments.
An agreement is only as good as its dispute resolution mechanism.
First, if obligations cannot be enforced, the agreement from which they
emanate becomes somewhat useless. If dispute resolution mechanisms
cannot guarantee that an agreement will be followed, the agreement becomes meaningless. Second, dispute resolution mechanisms are important
in ways beyond the resolution of particular disputes. The way in which
parties deal with disputes can affect the overall relationship between the
parties. Third, frustration with a dispute resolution mechanism, or continued disagreement with its results, can lead to withdrawal from the entire
agreement.
Looking at the world from a Rousseaunian perspective, our civilization emerged from a state of chaos with a social contract Disputes in
the state of chaos were settled by force. The social contract represented
the giving up of a certain amount of individual sovereignty in order to

3 See JEAN
CONTRACr,

RoussEAu, Of the Social Contract, in THE SOCIAL
14, 14-16 (Charles Frankel ed., Hafrer Publishing Co. 1947) (n.d.).
JACQUES
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reap the benefits of a society based on a common rule of law.4 Our court
system evolved as a way to determine rights and obligations pursuant to
the agreed upon rules. International relations and agreements are currently
in the process of evolving from that state of chaos to a society based on
the rule of law. International legal agreements are placing more reliance
on litigation as opposed to the use of force to resolve disputes.5
The submission of disputes to a third party is often a necessary
concession in trade agreements. This recognizes that an agreement is only
as useful as its dispute resolution mechanism. While intuitive analysis
may suggest that stronger parties will be less willing to submit to compulsory, neutral, and third party dispute resolution, it is likely that the
wielding of power will become less effective and less beneficial as
economies become interdependent.' Even though a country may have
more power, it would still be in the country's best interests to enter into
a trade agreement. Agreeing to the dispute resolution mechanism may be
a necessary concession for getting the other benefits that come with the
agreement as a whole.
In international trade, the debate about dispute resolution mechanisms
is often centered on whether they should be more legalistic and adjudicatory or more conciliatory and negotiation oriented. Unfortunately, there
are few absolutes which are agreed upon. Generally, it is agreed that a
dispute resolution mechanism should produce timely and objective decisions and prevent multiple jeopardy and legislation aimed at circumventing mechanism decisions However, no dispute resolution mechanism can
be detached from the reality of its context. Regardless of what we believe
makes a good mechanism, the best mechanism is the one that best serves
the attainment of the overall goals of the agreement to which it is attached.8 However, even though there are numerous methods of solving
disputes, there has been a discernible evolution towards more binding and
impartial systems.
4 See id.; see also Introduction, in THE SoCIAL CoNTRACr, supra note 3, at ix, ix.
s Cf. Robert E. Hudec, "Transcending the Ostensible": Some Reflections on the

Nature of Litigation Between Governments, 72 MINN. L. REv. 211, 212 (1987)
(comparing the international arena to "primitive societies" in which litigation is emerging as an alternative to force).
6 See Michael Reisman & Mark Wiedman, Contextual Imperatives of Dispute
Resolution Mechanisms: Some Hypotheses and their Applications in the Uruguay Round
and NAFTA, J. WORLD TRADE, June 29, 1995, at 5, 9.
' See Charles M. Gastle, Policy Alternatives For Reform of the Free Trade
Agreement of the Americas: Dispute Settlement Mechanisms, 26 LAw & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 735, 736 (1995).
8 See Reisman & Wiedman, supra note 6, at 10.
9 See James R. Holbein & Gary Carpentier, Trade Agreements and Dispute
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I. CHAPTER 19
A. Negotiating History and Goals
When discussions for the Free Trade Agreement began in the mid1980s, there was a "bilateral dismay" with the GATT (1947) dispute
resolution mechanism for anti-dumping and countervailing duty issues."
The dissatisfaction was the result of the "cumbersome system of committees and rules" that evolved under the consensus approach of GAT1
(1947)." Canada was particularly concerned with the non-tariff barriers
of United States anti-dumping and countervailing duty law. 2 Canada was
concerned that American industries had lobbied for protection, and had
already influenced administrative proceedings. 3 There were also complaints about time delays in addition to the Canadian belief that the Court
of International Trade and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal were too
deferential to agency determinations. 4
To solve these delay problems, Canada proposed that it be exempted
from U.S. anti-dumping law. Canada proposed that the negotiations lead
to a new regime to apply to each other's goods, which would be based
on principles of competition law.'
The primary U.S. concern was the pervasiveness of Canadian subsidies. The United States wanted to limit the use of such subsidies since
they allegedly distorted trade. 6 In the end, the United States was as

Settlement Mechanisms in the Western Hemisphere, 25 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 531,
531 (1993) (stating that trade disputes can be settled by consultation, negotiation, or
political persuasion; but the "intractable nature" of trade disputes has led to the
development of trade dispute resolution by mediation, conciliation, arbitration, and
adjudication).
"0 See Michael Krauss, The Record of the United States-CanadaBinational Dispute
Resolution Panels, 6 N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 85, 85 (1993).
Id.
12 See John M. Mercury,
Chapter 19 of the United States-Canada Free Trade
Agreement 1989-95: A Check on Administered Protection?, 15 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
525, 525 (1995).
'3 See Krauss, supra note 10, at 89-90.
4 See id.
's See generally Michael Hart, Dumping and Free Trade Areas, in ANTIDUMPING
LAW AND PRAcrcE 336-37 (John H. Jackson & Edwin A. Vermulst eds., 1989)
(explaining Canada's proposals during the negotiation of the 1987 Canada-United States
Free Trade Agreement).
6 See Charles M. Gastle & Jean G. Castel, Should the North American Free Trade
Agreement Dispute Settlement Mechanism in Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duty
Cases be Reformed in the Light of Softwood Lumber III?, 26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
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unwilling to exempt Canada from its existing trade law regime as Canada
was to limit its ability to subsidize. 7 Although it is possible that the
governments and negotiators may have been willing to entertain these
ideas, it is unlikely that constituents in either country would have accepted these changes. The negotiations came to a loggerhead. Nevertheless,
neither side wanted the negotiations to fail since there was a mutual
desire to secure more permanent and comprehensive access to each
other's markets. The Chapter 19 mechanism became the compromise
solution needed to save the agreement. The Canadians felt that the
binational panel system of the review of agency determinations would
serve as a check on the largely unfettered discretion of the International
Trade Administration and the International Trade Commission.'" It was
agreed that a working group be established to consider more effective
subsidies and anti-dumping practices. 9 The Chapter 19 mechanism was
intended as a temporary measure until a permanent substantive regime
could replace it.' NAFTA renewed this notion, but it is generally believed that it is currently residing in the dead letter office.
The next sections elaborate on the Chapter 19 dispute resolution
mechanism. They illustrate how Chapter 19 functioned and how things
may change now as the last of the Free Trade Agreement cases are
closed and NAFTA dispute resolution begins. NAFTA incorporated
several changes in an attempt to address some of the problems of the
Free Trade Agreement system. For instance it had been suggested that the
Free Trade Agreement did not achieve an actual meeting of the minds. 2'
The U.S. Congress believed that the binational panels would act exactly
as the national judicial review courts would have acted. ' The Canadians,
on the other hand, viewed the mechanism as a means to avoid the
extreme deference which had been granted to the administrative decisions
of the United States.'

Bus. 823, 829 (1995).
,7See id. at 829.
,SSee Jordan B. Goldstein, Dispute Resolution Under Chapter 19 of the United
States - Canada Free Trade Agreement: Did the Parties Get What They Bargained
For?, 31 STAN. J.INT'L L. 275, 282 (1995).
" See Gastle & Castle, supra note 16, at 735.
20 See id. at 829.
21 See Robert E. Burke & Brian F. Walsh, NAFTA Bi-National Panel Review:
Should it be Continued, Eliminated or Substantially Changed?, 20 BROOK J. INT'L L.
529, 539 (1995).

" See id. at 539.
See Gastle & Castle, supra note 16, at 882.
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B. Substance
The substantive law examined in this section is not the substance of
Chapter 19. Chapter 19 is essentially a procedure-creating mechanism; its
provisions are explored under the following section on procedure. The
substance analyzed in this section is the law that the bi-national panels
apply.
Briefly, under Chapter 19, when a binational panel reviews an
agency determination, it does so to determine if it was made in accordance with the anti-dumping and countervailing duty law of the country
that made the determination.
Although Canadian and U.S. anti-dumping and countervailing duty
laws are derived from the obligations agreed to under the WTO Agreements, there are significant differences in each country's substantive laws.
While the WTO establishes treaty obligations which are the same for all
nations, countries enjoy significant latitude in interpreting what the WTO
requires.24 Thus, the implementing legislation of each country differs in
significant ways. For example, Canada and the United States have different definitions and interpretations of material injury, countervailable
subsidy, and anti-dumping.
According to Article 1902 (1) of NAFTA:
Each Party reserves the right to apply its anti-dumping law and countervailing duty law to goods imported from the territory of any other Party.
Anti-dumping law and countervailing duty law include, as appropriate
for each Party, relevant statutes, legislative history, regulations, administrative practice and judicial precedents.'
Article 1904(2) echoes this by stating that when an involved Party
requests a panel to review an anti-dumping or countervailing duty determination, the Panel is to "determine whether such determination was in
accordance with the anti-dumping or countervailing duty law of the
importing party." Thus, it is clear that the substantive law with which
agencies must comply is the law of their own country.
The above example demonstrates a key distinction of Chapter 19.
The analysis conducted under the Chapter 19 mechanism focuses on the
administrative decision to determine whether the decision reached was in
accordance with the national law. A Chapter 19 panel has no authority to

24

See Mercury, supra note 12, at 551.

North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, art. 1902(1), 31 LL.M.
605 [hereinafter NAFTA].
26

Id. art. 1904(2).
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question the validity of the national law that was applied. Thus, the
Canadian goal of being exempted from U.S. anti-dumping and countervailing duty laws appears to have been foregone. Canadian industries can
only use Chapter 19 to challenge U.S. administrative decisions as not
being in accordance with U.S. law.
Chapter 19 addresses the Canadian concerns about the Court of
International Trade and Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal allowing decisions to stand regardless of whether they were politically motivated,
thus showing what Canadians perceived to be excessive deference to the
United States. The Chapter 19 process aims to remove the political
element by mandating that panels only uphold decisions if they are
correctly based on law.
One of the primary concerns with the Chapter 19 dispute resolution
mechanism is that its operation will result in the creation of a distinct and
divergent body of case law. The concern has increased with the addition
of a third country, Mexico. Panels often cite previous panel decisions.27
To say that panelists will not affect the direction of the law is to say
that appellate judges have no such effect: both assertions are naive if
not nonsensical. =
Since the Chapter 19 process only applies to NAFTA countries, the
argument follows that panels may engage in different levels of agency
scrutiny than that of the Court of International Trade or the Federal
Circuit Courts of Appeal would do when reviewing agency determinations
concerning other countries. Thus, even though the underlying legal text
will remain the same, there will emerge a different law for NAFrA
countries than for non-NAFTA countries. Canada will thus achieve,
through NAFTA, what it could not achieve through negotiations. Although a new written law would not have been needed, the concern is
that Canada would, to an extent, escape the current U.S. anti-dumping
and countervailing duty regime, and become the object of a unique
regime with a different level of scrutiny.
NAFTA addresses the concern that countries will try to change their
substantive anti-dumping and countervailing duty laws to serve protectionist interests or to circumvent panel decisions. It seeks to lock in laws as
they existed at the time of agreement. According to Article 1903, if a
Party amends its anti-dumping and countervailing duty laws, and the
amendment applies to NAFTA Parties, the affected Parties may request a

2 See Burke & Walsh, supra note 21, at 545.
= Krauss, supra note 10, at 91.
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binational panel to investigate and issue a declaratory opinion.29 The
panel determines whether the law conforms with WTO obligations,
overturns a panel decision, or fails to conform to the object and purpose
of NAFTA as defined in Article 1902 (2)(d)(ii)3°:
[T]o establish fair and predictable conditions for the progressive liberalization of trade between the Parties to this Agreement while maintaining
effective and fair disciplines on unfair trade practices, such object and
purpose to be ascertained from the provisions of this 3Agreement, its
preamble and objectives, and the practice of the Parties. '
If the panel recommends modification of the law, the Parties shall enter
consultations to achieve a solution. 2 If no corrective action is taken and
no solution is agreed upon, the affected Party may enact equivalent measures or terminate the agreement.33 This mechanism is more bark than
bite. Although the mechanism addresses the concern of protectionist
legislation and the circumvention of panel decisions, it lacks a workable
enforcement mechanism. The option of withdrawing from the agreement
within sixty days has little practical difference from the general right to
withdraw with six months notice contained in Article 2205."4 Also, the
right to enact similar legislation is a statement of the obvious since if one
country can change its laws in a particular way, it logically follows that
the other Parties may do the same.
It has been suggested that the U.S. regime is more protectionist than
the Canadian regime. First, before the Subsidies Code of the Uruguay
Round, the "United States law with respect to what constitutes a
'countervailable subsidy' was broader in scope than the approach adopted
in Canada during the Free Trade Agreement years."' This allowed the
United States to impose countervailing duties against more goods. Second,
the definition of "material injury" in the United States set a lower
threshold than in Canada, thereby permitting more U.S. petitioners to
succeed in illustrating material injury. However, because of Chapter 19's
acceptance of each countries' domestic trade law regime, it is not the
proper forum for addressing protectionist law. Chapter 19 can only be
used to address agency determinations which may be too deferential or

2 NAFTA, supra note 25, art. 1903(1).
3 Id.
31 See

id. art. 1902(2)(d)(ii).
See id. art. 1903(3)(a).
33 See id. art. 1903(b).
See id. art. 2205.
32

31
36

See Mercury, supra note 12, at 551-52.

Id.
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swayed by political considerations. The forum is only used to contest the
application of the laws as they stand.
C. Procedure
As previously mentioned, Chapter 19 is a mechanism primarily
concerned with procedure. Neither the dispute resolution mechanism itself
nor NAFTA contain any substantive law in the anti-dumping and countervailing duty area. Chapter 19 is a procedural mechanism intended to supplant the judicial review of agency determinations in the respective
NAFMA countries. Therefore, any evaluation of Chapter 19 must begin
with and derive from its procedural structure. This section examines
various aspects of Chapter 19, including which Parties can appropriately
initiate proceedings, the time allowed to complete proceedings and issue
panel reports, panel composition, the Extraordinary Challenge Committee
mechanism, and the standard of review that panels and the Extraordinary
Challenge Committees have applied.
1. Panel Initiation
One of the fundamental differences between Chapter 19 and the
WTO dispute resolution mechanism is that Chapter 19 is primarily a
mechanism to be used by private Parties. Although governments will
always be involved in dispute resolution by virtue of the fact that their
agency determinations are being reviewed, private Parties may initiate the
process. According to Article 1904(5):
An involved Party on its own initiative may request review of a final
determination by a panel and shall, on request of a person who would
otherwise be entitled under the law of the importing Party to commence
domestic procedures for judicial review of that final determination, request such review.37
Article 1911 defines "involved Party" as, "(a) the importing Party; or (b)
a Party whose goods are the subject of a final determination."3' 8 This
recognizes the general character of Chapter 19 as a replacement for judicial review. Thus, any Party authorized to initiate judicial review may
initiate Chapter 19 panel proceedings.

SNAFMA, supra
31 Id. art. 1911.

note 25, art. 1904(5).
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2. Time Restraints
One of Canada's complaints before the Free Trade Agreement was
the length of time it took the Court of International Trade to review final
agency determinations. Prior to the Free Trade Agreement, the Court of
International Trade took an average of 734 days to complete its review 9
The Free Trade Agreement and NAFTA have significantly reduced the
amount of time it takes for review to be completed. According to Article
1904(14), final decisions are to be reached within 315 days of the date
on which a request for a panel is made.' While the Free Trade Agreement was in force, Chapter 19 panels issued initial decisions within 360
days.41 Although Court of International Trade procedures have since been
implemented to speed up the review process, Chapter 19 still presents an
expeditious dispute resolution mechanism.
NAFTA is, however, hampered by the remand process. Article
1904(8) states that a "panel may uphold a final determination, or remand
it for action not inconsistent with the panel's decision."'42 Panels cannot
simply reverse agency determinations. Allowing such a replacement
provision would effectively permit panels to substitute their own findings
for those of the agency. The result has been that agencies often try to
maintain the result of their determination while attempting to make it
conform with the panel's decision. This has often resulted in second,
more strongly worded remands where panels have made their findings
specific enough to force the agency to comply. Reversals are not allowed
formally, except through narrowly worded remands. Panels have interpreted Article 1904(8) as giving them the power to issue final remands.'
These typically enumerate compliance requirements. The ability to terminate adjudication after a second remand had a disciplining effect, particularly on the U.S. agencies.' Regardless of the ability to ultimately issue
final remands, the remand procedure has negated some of the time advantage of the Chapter 19 process.

" See United States General Accounting Office, United States-Canada Free Trade
Agreement Factors Contributing to Controversy and the Appeal of Trade Remedy Cases
to Bi-National Panels, (GAO/GGD-95-175 BR), Washington, D.C., June 16, 1995, at
57-58 [hereinafter GAO Study].
4 NAFTA, supra note 25, art. 1904(14).
See Mercury, supra note 12, at 542.
42 NAFTA, supra note 25, art. 1904(8).
43 Id. art. 1904(8).
' See Mercury, supra note 12, at 543.

A HOBSON'S CHOICE FOR CANADA?

19981

Nevertheless, the length of time to reach final decisions is shortened
by the fact that there is no traditional appeal process in NAFTA. Under
the Free Trade Agreement, Extraordinary Challenge Committee proceedings had to be completed within thirty days. NAFTA extends this to
ninety days, but this still represents a relatively short period of time.4'
Even if NAFTA were to replace the Extraordinary Challenge Committee
with a more common appeal process, it is likely that this ninety day
period would be sufficient. This is the maximum amount of time the
appeal process is allotted in the WTO.'
3. Panel Composition
The composition of Chapter 19 panels is unique. There are no
barriers to establishing panels as there were in GATT (1947). Annex
1901.2 sets out the procedures for establishing a panel.47 The Parties to
the agreement are each to maintain rosters of twenty-five individuals.'
Within thirty days of a request for a panel, each Party shall choose two
panelists, usually from the roster.49 Within another twenty-five days, the
Parties must agree on a fifth panelist, and, if no agreement is reached, the
Parties draw lots and the winner gains the right to select the fifth panelisti ° The panelists then choose their own chairperson from the lawyers
on the panel.51
a. Trade Experts
According to Annex 1901.2 (1), the people selected to be on each
Party's roster, "shall be of good character, high standing and repute, and
shall be chosen strictly on the basis of objectivity, reliability, sound
judgement and general familiarity with international trade law."52 In
addition, a majority of panelists must be lawyers in good standing. 3 The

' NAFrA, supra note 25, annex 1904.13.
See generally Understanding, supra note 1 (stating that 60 days is allowed from
notification to panel report circulation and the panel can extend this to a maximum of

90 days).
' NAFTA, supra note 25, annex 1901.2 (stating the requirements for panel members, including objectivity, reliability, sound judgment, familiarity with international trade
law, a majority being lawyers in good standing).

4 See id. annex 1901.2(1).
4 See id.
5oSee id. annex 1901.2(3).
5'See id. annex 1901.2(4).
52 Id. annex 1901.2(1).

5 Id. annex 1901.2(2).
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rationale behind the use of "trade experts" as panelists is that these
people are familiar with the law and can infuse the process with their
knowledge and expertise. This seems to be in accord with the Canadian
goal of depoliticizing the process.
It has been generally felt that the use of trade experts has led to
well-reasoned decisions.54 This is probably the result of the level of
knowledge and experience of the panelists. It is also possible that people
given adjudicatory authority for the first time take the task seriously and
are very conscientious of their duty. It has been suggested by Judge
Wilkey, an American who served on the Softwood Lumber III Extraordinary Challenge Committee, and others, that non-judges are not attuned to
matters of jurisdiction and are more willing to substitute their own
conclusions for those of agencies as opposed to granting the required
degree of deference.'5 While the panel reports demonstrate that panels
have been aware of and are attentive to matters of jurisdiction, they have
often refused to be deferential to unsupported agency determinations.'
The United States has been concerned with the lack of deference
which panels have shown to its agencies' determinationsY This concern
is not unfounded. In examining U.S. agency final determinations, panels
have constructed a relatively strong standard of review that often results
in reversal. 8
To address this problem, the United States negotiated for, and had a
clause added to, Annex 1901.2(1) stating that each party's roster of
panelist candidates "shall include judges or former judges to the fullest
'
extent practicable."59
The United States Statement of Administrative
Action highlights the benefits which it expects this change to bring about

[Tihe participation of panelists with judicial experience would help to
ensure that, in accordance with the requirement of Article 1904, panels
review determinations of the administering authorities precisely as would
a court of the importing country by applying exclusively that country's
AD and CVD law and its standard of review. In addition, the involvement of judges in the process would diminish the possibility that panels
and courts will develop distinct bodies of U.S. law.'
See, e.g., Mercury, supra note 12, at 598.
5 In re Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, No. ECC-94-1904-01
USA, at 58 (Extraordinary Challenge Committee Proceeding, Aug. 3, 1994) (Wilkey, J.,
dissenting).
See Mercury, supra note 12, at 598.
5 See NAFTA Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3311 (1988 & 1997 Supp.).

5 See id.

NAFTA, supra note 25, annex 1901.2(1).
' Statement of Administrative Action to the North American Free Trade Agreement
59
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The U.S. position is that judges are more attentive to questions of
jurisdiction and will be less likely to substitute their own conclusions for
those of the agencies. However, Canada has stated that it intends to
continue its emphasis on international trade expertise as a central consideration in its choice of roster members.6' Although the United States
bargained for this change, it has yet to appoint any judges to its roster,
while Canada has already done so.
If and when more judges are appointed to NAFTA panels, it is
possible that a more deferential approach will emerge. Although this may
be more in line with the U.S. goal of having panels act like reviewing
courts, it may make the Chapter 19 process a less innovative dispute
resolution mechanism.
b. The Extraordinary Challenge Committee
There is no appeal, in a conventional sense, from bi-national panel
decisions. Typically, appeals consist of an examination of the legal and,
at times, factual conclusions of a lower body. The focus of the Extraordinary Challenge Committees is much narrower. One of the benefits of the
absence of a traditional appeal route in Chapter 19 is the time saved
when compared to the process used by the Court of International Trade.
The only avenue of complaint about a panel decision is the Extraordinary
Challenge Committee procedure. This part of the mechanism is unique in
the world of international trade disputes.
Annex 1904.13(1) states that Extraordinary Challenge Committees
shall be comprised of three members, all being judges or former
judges.62 Each Party selects five people to be on its roster and each
Party chooses one member of the committee with the winner of a lot
picking the third member.63 According to Article 1904(13), in order to
appeal to an Extraordinary Challenge Committees, it must be alleged that:
(a)(i) a member of the panel was guilty of gross misconduct, bias, or a
serious conflict of interest, or otherwise materially violated the rules of
conduct,
(ii) the panel seriously departed from a fundamental rule of procedure,
or

Implementation Act, H.R. Doc. No. 103-159, at 195 (1993).
6 See North American Free Trade Agreement Canadian Statement on
Implementation, 1 NORTH AMmCAN FREE TRADE AGREEmENTS (James R. Holbein &
Donald J. Musch eds., 1994).
62 NAFTA, supra note 25, annex 1904.13(1).
6

Id.
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(iii) the panel manifestly exceeded its powers, authority or jurisdiction
set out in this Article, for example by failing to apply the appropriate
standardof review, and

(b) any of the actions set out in subparagraph (a) has materially affected
the panel's decision and threatens the integrity of the bi-national panel
review process ....

'

There have only been three Extraordinary Challenge Committee panels, all
under the Free Trade Agreement.' They all held that the Extraordinary
Challenge Committee is not an appellate body and, therefore, does not
review routine allegations of errors.' The committees appear to have
taken the words "extraordinary challenge" quite seriously in establishing
a very high threshold for Extraordinary Challenge Committee review.
The standard of review clause was not in the Free Trade Agreement,
but was added to NAFTA at the request of the United States.67 The
general sentiment in the United States, echoed and crystallized by Judge
Wilkey's Extraordinary Challenge Committee dissent in Softwood Lumber
III, is that panels have often failed to apply the appropriate standard of
review." This controversy is made clear by the fact that most panel
dissents concern the standard of review employed.' The United States
contends that the addition of the standard of review clause allows Extraordinary Challenge Committees to probe more deeply into the reasoning of panels and to explicitly examine standard of review issues. The
call for more scrutiny at the Extraordinary Challenge Committee level
appears to be a response to the unexpected lack of deference at the binational panel level. The Canadian government contends that the amendment only explains what was already implicit in the agreement, and
therefore, no change in the Extraordinary Challenge Committee level of
review should be expected.

Id. art. 1903(13)(a)-(b) (emphasis added).
' See In re Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Pork from Canada, ECC-91-1904-01-USA
(Appeal of USA-89-1904-11) (June 14, 1991); In re Live Swine from Canada, ECC-931904-01-USA (Appeal of USA-91-1904-03) (Apr. 8, 1993); In re Certain Softwood
Lumber Products from Canada, ECC-94-1904-01-USA (Appeal of USA-92-1904-01)
(Aug. 3, 1994).
See Gastle & Castel, supra note 16, at 850.
67 See NAFTA Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3311 (1988 & 1997 Supp.)
(describing addition of standard of review clause).
'6 In re Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, No. ECC-94-1904-01
USA, at 57 (Extraordinary Challenge Committee Proceeding, Aug. 3, 1994) (Wilkey, J.,
dissenting).
' See Mercury, supra note 12, at 538.
64
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It may also be significant that Extraordinary Challenge Committee
decisions under the Free Trade Agreement were to be rendered within
thirty days. Under NAFTA, this has been extended to ninety days.7" Although this says nothing in and of itself, future Extraordinary Challenge
Committee panels may interpret it as an indication of the intent of the
parties that review by the Extraordinary Challenge Committee be more
thorough than it was under the Free Trade Agreement. Moreover, the
change in the grounds for appeal to the Extraordinary Challenge Committee suggests a shift to a more typical appellate court proceeding'
c. Nationality
For the integrity of a dispute resolution mechanism to be maintained,
its decisions must be made in a fair and objective way by neutral arbiters. For people or nations to confidently submit themselves to the
authority of a third party, they must have a degree of faith in the third
party's judgement. The nationality of panelists is an obvious area of
concern for international decision-makers like these bi-national panels.
Assuming panelists make honest attempts to be objective, there is still a
concern with national bias. It is a natural reaction for people to be more
sympathetic and understanding of the position of the party who is most
similar to themselves. Participants and other observers are always aware
of the possibility of national bias and keep a watchful eye for it. The
issue can be explosive regardless of the actual presence of national bias.
Generally, Chapter 19 panels have not split along national lines.
However, the recent nationality split in both the Softwood Lumber III
panel and the Extraordinary Challenge Committee has sparked debate
about the impact of panelist nationality?' Both the five-member panel
and the three-member Extraordinary Challenge Committee were composed
of a majority of Canadians who all found in favor of Canadian industry,
and essentially overturned the U.S. agency determinations.' The two
"' NAFTA, supra note 25, annex 1904.13(2); see also NAFTA Implementation Act,
19 U.S.C. §§ 3311. (1988 & 1997 Supp.) ("tripling the length of time available to the
ECC to undertake its review").
' See Mercury, supra note 12, at 600.
n See Gastle & Castle, supra note 16, at 825-27 (discussing how Judge Wilkey's
dissent has fed U.S. criticism of the Chapter 19 mechanism, including panelist
nationality); see also Burke & Walsh, supra note 21, at 59; see generally Barbara
Buchotlz, Sawing Off the Third Branch: Precluding Judicial Review of Anti-Dumping
and CountervailingDuty Assessments Under Free Trade Agreements, 19 MD. J. INT'L
L. & TRADE 175 (1995).

' See generally In re Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, USA-921904-01 (May 6, 1993 and Dec. 17, 1993); In re Certain Softwood Lumber Products
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Americans on the panel, and the sole American on the Extraordinary
Challenge Committee, Judge Wilkey, supported the agency determinations
in dissent. This clear split along national lines added much fuel to the
national bias debate. The issue also gained considerable attention because
of the importance of the lumber trade between the two nations and the
long history of the dispute.
It is important to note that Softwood Lumber III is the first dispute
in which both the panel and the Extraordinary Challenge Committee split
along national lines.74 An examination of the results of all disputes under
Chapter 19 demonstrates a remarkable degree of unanimity of panel
results. 5 In particular, where panels have been reviewing U.S. agency
determinations, they frequently agreed upon whether the determination
should be affirmed or remanded.76 There appears to be little evidence for
any assertions of a systemic problem of national bias.
The nationality debate was focused upon and most ardently advanced
by Judge Wilkey. Judge Wilkey did not directly attack the credibility or
veracity of the Canadian panelists or Committee members. However, he
argued that the Canadians, because of their different backgrounds and
legal training, could not fully appreciate the nuances of U.S. administrative law, and thus were ill-equipped to review U.S. agency
determinations.'
Judge Wilkey's position is somewhat untenable in light of evidence
which demonstrates that panel decisions are often unanimous and rarely
split along national lines. However, he has highlighted the one area where
nationality has been linked to decisions. In most of the cases where
dissenting opinions have been delivered, the applicable standard of review
has typically been the issue of contention. These divisions were usually
along national lines.'
The overall unanimity of panel decisions suggests that there is not a
general problem with national bias. There does, however, appear to be a
problem with the disagreement about the appropriate standard of review.

from Canada, ECC-94-1904-01 USA (Aug. 3, 1994).
'
See Gastle & Castel, supra note 16, at 876.
7 See id.
76 See Mercury, supra note 12, at 537-38.
' In re Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, No. ECC-94-1904-01
USA, at 58 (Extraordinary Challenge Committee Proceeding, Aug. 3, 1994) (Wilkey, J.,
dissenting).
' See Mercury, supra note 12, at 538.
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4. Standard of Review
According to Article 1904(3), bi-national panels apply both the law
of the country whose agency made the determination under review and
that country's standard of review:
The panel shall apply the standard of review... and the general legal
principles that a court of the importing Party otherwise would apply to
a review of a determination of the competent investigating authority.79
When an agency decision undergoes judicial review, a standard of review
is set out so the reviewing court has a guide as to how much deference
it is to afford the agency determination in question. Canada, the United
States, and Mexico all have different standards of review for their various
agencies' determinations. These different standards of review have resulted
in different results at the bi-national level.
A recent study has concluded that far more U.S. agency determinations were overturned by bi-national panels than Canadian determinations.' Part of the reason for this discrepancy is the highly deferential
standard applicable to Canadian International Trade Tribunal determinations. The Canadian International Trade Tribunal is responsible for determining if a product has been dumped or unfairly subsidized. Revenue
Canada determines if the domestic industry has been materially injured."1
There is an element of Canadian administrative law known as a
privative clause.' A privative clause acts to insulate the decisions of
specialized agencies from judicial review. The decisions of agencies with
a high degree of expertise are upheld unless they are "patently
unreasonable."' As a result, many disputable Canadian International
Trade Tribunal determinations have been upheld by panels.84 The Canadian International Trade Tribunal's privative clause has been repealed.'
However, in a non-trade related case, the Supreme Court of Canada
concluded that even in the absence of a privative clause "considerable
deference" should still be afforded to expert tribunals.86 Thus it is un7 NAFTA, supra note 25, art. 1904(3).
'

See Mercury, supra note 12, at 535-36.

See Special Imports Measures Acts, R.S.C., ch. s-15 (1985) (Can.).
Section 28(1) was the clause that affected CITT final determinations during the
Free Trade Agreement. See Federal Court Act, R.S.C., ch. f-7 (1985) (Can.).

See United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 579 v.
Bradco Construction Ltd., [1992] S.C.R. 316.
See Mercury, supra note 12, at 557.

See Reisman & Wiedman, supra 6, at 5, 9.

See Pezim v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Brokers), [1994] S.C.R. 557,
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likely that Canadian International Trade Tribunal determinations will
undergo the level of scrutiny to which Internal Trade Administration
determinations have been subject.
In addition to the high level of deference given to the Canadian
International Trade Tribunal, panels often applied conflicting judicial
interpretations as to the proper U.S. standard, and constructed a stringent
review standard, resulting in the reversal of several U.S. agency determinations." In contrast, the final injury determinations of Revenue Canada
and the International Trade Commission generally withstood panel review."
It remains to be seen how the additional clause in the NAFTA
Extraordinary Challenge Committee grounds for remand will affect panel
decisions and the Extraordinary Challenge Committee process. There is
obviously a significant amount of debate over the correct standards of
review. The first problem seems to be the willingness of panels to
interpret the U.S. standard as one of less deference while the standard to
be applied to Canadian International Trade Tribunal determinations is interpreted as highly deferential. This may result in panels overturning more
U.S. decisions and lowering U.S. duty findings, but this may not be
inconsistent with NAFTA. Since both countries retain their own antidumping and countervailing duty laws and attendant standards of review,
disparate results should be expected.
D. Enforcement
Any trade agreement is only as good as the level of the Parties'
compliance with it. If Parties are unwilling to be bound by their agreement, then the agreement is meaningless. Parties often voluntarily submit
themselves to the authority of a binding dispute resolution mechanism as
it is one of the only mechanisms that can assure compliance. Thus,
enforcement and implementation of panel reports are central to the
success of an agreement.
With respect to enforcement, Chapter 19 once again distinguishes
itself as unique. The relevant provisions are contained in Article 1904.9
The bi-national panels completely replace national judicial review of final
anti-dumping and countervailing duty determinations.' Once an involved
598-99 (deferring to the British Columbia Securities Commission because of its specialization of duties and role as policy developer in the securities industry).
See Mercury, supra note 12, at 553.
See id. at 552-53.
See generally NAFTA, supra note 25, art. 1904 (describing the review of final
anti-dumping and countervailing duty determinations).
' Id. art. 1904(1) (stating that "each Party shall replace judicial review of final
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Party requests a panel, the final determination cannot be reviewed under
national judicial review procedures. 9' The panels can affirm or remand
agency determinations and can issue final remands.' Panel decisions
cannot be appealed to domestic courts. Article 1904(9) states that "[t]he
decision of a panel under this Article shall be binding on the involved
Parties with respect to the particular matter between the Parties that is
before the panel."
Although there has been considerable debate about the efficacy and
merits of Chapter 19, there has never been a problem with compliance
with panel reports. All panel and Extraordinary Challenge Committee
findings have been followed by the respective agencies.94
A cloud hanging over the Chapter 19 dispute resolution mechanism
is the possibility of a constitutional challenge in the United States.
Constitutional concerns are related to the separation of powers, the
appointment of non-Article Ell judges, and due process. Although NAFTA
provides for constitutional review of the bi-national panel process, there
are significant "legal barriers that discourage Parties from seeking judicial
review." For example, NAFTA requires the Party filing the constitutional challenge to pay the opponent's attorneys' fees if the challenge
fails.' Also, pursuant to an executive order of President Reagan, the
President accepts, as a whole, all decisions of the Chapter 19 dispute
resolution mechanism even if a U.S. court has declared the process
unconstitutionalY These and other factors have "undermine[d] the likelihood, and perhaps the effectiveness, of judicial review of the panel
system." '
E. Chapter 19 Analysis and Conclusions
The Chapter 19 experiment has been nothing if not interesting. It has
sparked considerable debate and discussion not only concerning trade

anti-dumping and countervailing duty determinations with bi-national panel review).
91Id. art. 1904(l)-(2).
9 Id. art. 1904.
Id. art. 1904(9).
' NAFTA article 1904(9) states that panel decisions are binding on the parties,
while article 1904(11) states that reports are not subject to judicial review and that no
appeals in domestic courts are allowed. Article 1904.13(13) then states that ECC reports
are binding on the parties. Id. art. 1904.
' Robert P. Deyling, Free Trade Agreements and the Federal Courts: Emerging
Issues, 27 ST. MARY's L. J. 353, 379 (1996).

' See id.
97 See id. at 380.
93 Id. at 357.
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between Canada and the United States, but also about dispute resolution
in general. It is arguable that the mechanism has been advantageous.
The quality of panel decisions has generally been exemplary. Panel
decisions tend to be well-written and well-reasoned, helping to inform
interested persons as to why certain decisions were reached. This forestalls various criticisms about decisions being arbitrary or based on bias.
Panel decisions have generally been unanimous, non-partisan, depoliticized, and have provided a check on agency actions. The mechanism has
achieved one of its primary goals of resolving disputes in a relatively
short period of time. Although this quickness was hampered to a certain
extent by the remand process, a rule of finality developed to limit the
time hemorrhage.
One of the primary concerns about Chapter 19 is the development of
a distinct body of law for NAFTA countries. Although panels have cited
other panel reports, there is no conclusive evidence that a separate
jurisprudence has emerged." Concern remains that as the body of panel
decisions builds it will have an unprecedented effect on reports. This
should, however, be held in check by the continued existence and evolution of the non-NAFTA jurisprudence. The NAFTA countries continue to
have trade disputes with other nations. These disputes wind their way
through each country's judicial review process. The use of those decisions
as a yardstick should serve as a check on NAFTA reviews.
Although the Canadians did not obtain the exemption from U.S.
trade law that they were seeking, Canadian exporters have done reasonably well under Chapter 19. The mechanism has resulted in some relief
from U.S. trade law by requiring the International Trade Administration
and the International Trade Commission to be more disciplined in their
determinations."° The Mercury study cites the following factors as
having contributed to the disparity of results of Free Trade Agreement decisions in favor of Canadian exporters:
(i) A relatively flexible United States "standard of review" which, when
applied by panelists, could be used to effectively overturn agency determinations;
(ii) The existence of a "privative" clause which, when combined with
Canada's in-grained judicial predisposition toward "deference," protected
the Canadian International Trade Tribunal from exacting panel review;
(iii) Panel ability to invoke a rule of "finality" which effectively limited
further opportunity for U.S. domestic agencies to re-formulate and
support their conclusions;

See GAO Study, supra note 39, at 83.
,o See Mercury, supra note 12, at 527.
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(iv) A high threshold which had to be surmounted if panel decisions
were to be successfully challenged before Extraordinary Challenge
Committees;
(v) The use of international trade lawyers and economists as panelists;
and
(vi) A consistent effort on the part of panelists reviewing U.S. agency
final determinations to formulate and apply an unyielding standard of
review, both in initial panel opinions and in subsequent judgments.'
On average, Free Trade Agreement panels reduced the duty to be applied
by the International Trade Administration by 28.2%."~ In contrast, the
United States has had limited success in challenging Canadian agency
determinations."t° The disparity of outcomes may be a result of the
different standards of review as stated and applied, but could also stem
from Canadian determinations being more detailed and supported than
U.S. determinations. However, regardless of whether there are valid
reasons for the disparity, the fact that disparity exists no doubt contributes
to U.S. criticism of the mechanism.
The changes of NAFTA may serve to correct the disparity of results.
NAFTA duplicates most of Chapter 19 and simply applies it on a trilateral basis to include Mexico. As of yet, the mechanism appears to have
functioned much as it did under the Free Trade Agreement.' However
two changes could lead to significant differences. First, an increased
number of judges on a panel could lead to panels being more deferential
to agency determinations. Second, the specific inclusion of standard of
review misapplication as an example of a panel exceeding its power,
authority, or jurisdiction may affect the level of deference given. Although these changes do not appear to be influencing panel decisions in
themselves, the real test will be at the Extraordinary Challenge Committee
level. As of yet there have been no NAFTA Extraordinary Challenge
Committee appeals. This addition to the Extraordinary Challenge Committee's terms, coupled with tripling the amount of time Extraordinary
Challenge Committees are given to complete their review may lead to
less deferential Extraordinary Challenge Committees. This could result in
a check being placed on panel decisions which are not sufficiently
deferential. It is possible that these changes may have no effect whatsoev-

'0' Id. at 596-97.
"0
"3

See id. at 529.
See id. at 550.

"4 See id. at 601.

470

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. 30:447

er on Chapter 19 review. However, it is also possible that the mechanism
could move back towards the traditional judicial review."
In addition to the possible move back towards a more traditional and
deferential style of review, the disparity of results, and the possibility of
the emergence of a distinct NAFTA jurisprudence, there are other remaining shortcomings of the mechanism. Chapter 19 only addresses the
procedural shortcomings of the current system, and leaves the underlying
problem of the trade laws themselves untouched.
Chapter 19 is not an end-all mechanism. The mechanism is somewhat temporary in that an exporter can still be subject to successive
Chapter 19 proceedings in the future for the same type of goods. Chapter
19 simply serves as a review process for agency determinations. After the
process is over, nothing precludes a domestic industry from launching
another complaint at the national level which can result in anti-dumping
or countervailing duty penalties. An exporter has no recourse except to
appeal the new findings to another Chapter 19 panel.
Furthermore, the new panel is not bound by the findings of the first
panel, and could find against the exporter. This problem is demonstrated
by the Softwood Lumber dispute. There have been three Chapter 19
proceedings based on essentially the same facts.'" The U.S. industry has
been relentless, and essentially pledged to continue the fight until it
receives a just result. Recently, an agreement was signed respecting the
volume of Canadian softwood that will be allowed into the United States
without additional duties."° Under the agreement, the U.S. industry has
agreed not to launch another trade action for five years, the duration of
the agreement.'" Critics have pointed to this dispute as a failure of the
Chapter 19 mechanism.'" However, the mechanism has proved to han105

See id.

'" U.S. industries have brought two cases to Chapter 19 panels both of which
required remands and one which required an Extraordinary Challenge Committee. See
In re Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, USA-92-1904-01 (May 6, 1993);
In re Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, USA-92-1904-01 (Dec. 17,
1993) (remand issued); In re Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, ECC-941904-01 (Aug. 3, 1994); In re Softwood Lumber from Canada, USA-92-1904-02 (July
26, 1993); In re Softwood Lumber from Canada, USA-92-1904-02 (Jan. 29, 1994)
(remand issued); In re Softwood Lumber from Canada, USA-92-1904-02 (July 6, 1994)
(remand issued). It was the threat of another such action which led to the signing of
the Memorandum of Understanding currently in place that imposes a quota on softwood
lumber from Canada.
"o See Canada - United States Softwood Lumber Agreement, May 29, 1996, U.S.Can., 35 I.L.M. 1195.
log Id.

" See Gastle & Castle, supra note 16, at 881-82; Mercury, supra note 12, at 604.
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die many of the disputes in an effective way. Perhaps the Softwood Lumber Dispute is simply too big for the mechanism, but the mechanism is
sufficient in most circumstances.
The most fundamental problem with Chapter 19 is its limited scope.
As already stated, the mechanism does nothing to address the problems
of the trade laws themselves. It can be argued that the laws are protectionist and should be replaced. The mechanism may serve to place a
check on the non-tariff barrier of agency determinations. However,
Chapter 19 can only strive to assure that determinations are arrived at in
accordance with the law as it currently stands. Complaints about the laws
must be voiced in a different forum.
F. The Future of Chapter 19
There are numerous possibilities for the future of the Chapter 19
dispute resolution mechanism. The first possibility is to do nothing and
let the mechanism operate as is. This appears to be the path the Parties
are currently following, and likely will for some time. There has not yet
been enough experience with the NAFrA version of Chapter 19 to make
informed judgements. It may perform exactly as its Free Trade Agreement
predecessor did, or there may also be significant differences. It is simply
too early to tell.
Another possibility is to abandon the mechanism altogether and
revert to national judicial review. Judge Wilkey and other critics of the
process have suggested this alternative."' Although this is possible,
governments do not appear ready to abandon the Chapter 19 mechanism.
This option may become more viable if the criticisms of the Free Trade
Agreement mechanism turn out not to be remedied by the NAFTA
amendments.
The formation of a regular appellate body would be a significant
step. Although the amendments to the Extraordinary Challenge Committee
provisions suggest a move to a more typical appellate procedure, it is still
a different entity. A regular appellate body could help to alleviate much
of the criticism directed at the bi-national panels. If Parties had a regular
appeals process, there would be a means for fuller venting of complaints
and a reduction of the risk of "wrong" decisions. An appeal body would
lend credibility to the mechanism, and interested groups might be more
II. See

Should the NAFTA Chapter 19 Dispute Settlement Mechanism of Ad Hoc

Panels be Continued or Extended to Other Countries: Before the Subcommittee on
Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives (June 21,
1995) (written testimony of Malcolm R. Wilkey, retired U.S. Circuit Judge), available
in 1995 WL 371096; see also Burke & Walsh, supra note 21, at 560-61.
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willing to accept decisions that have been subjected to a second examination.
The mechanism could take a step into the substantive sphere by
expanding the provisions with respect to reviewing new legislation,
particularly those aimed at overturning panel decisions."' Protectionist
changes could be deemed to be not applicable to NAFTA countries.
It is apparent that much of the controversy regarding the mechanism
concerns the interpretation and application of the correct standard of
review. The only other issue which has sparked as much controversy is
the nationality of panelists. However, nationality only became an issue
with respect to the standard of review. Although it is highly unlikely that
the United States would exempt its NAFTA partners from its trade laws,
a step in the right direction may be the harmonization of the standards of
review. Although this is outside the current rubric of the law of each
country being applied as is, it may represent a productive compromise.
12
The standards of review in the countries are more similar than not.
By agreeing on a harmonized standard of review, the issue of the amount
of deference to be applied could be directly addressed for all Chapter 19
cases.
III. WTO DISPUTE

RESOLUTION MECHANISM

The GATT dispute resolution mechanism has evolved significantly
since its inception. When the GATT was first founded, disputes went to
working groups. Only after a few years was the idea of formal panels
and reports implemented.
Numerous complaints and dissatisfactions with the GATT (1947)
dispute resolution mechanism led to the changes implemented during the
Uruguay Round. GATT (1947) procedures and practice developed on an
ad hoc basis, and were formalized in the Tokyo Round." 3 However, the
mechanism remained incomplete. The main stumbling block was the
consensus approach. Consensus of all Contracting Parties was necessary
for the establishment of panels and the adoption of their reports. This

. See Gastle & Castel, supra note 16, at 885 (discussing changes in trade laws due
to NAFTA, the Canadian Internal Trade Agreement, and the WTO); id. at 893
(discussing WTO standards of appellate review).
2' The Canadian standard can be found in § 28(1) of the Federal Court Act, R.S.C.
ch. f-7 (1985) (Can.). The U.S. standard is located at 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)
(1988). Although there are many similarities between the two standards, it has been
pointed out that the Canadian standard is somewhat narrow, and therefore affords more
deference to agency determinations. See Mercury, supra note 12, at 551-54.
"' See generally Robert E. Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement after the Tokyo Round:
An Unfinished Business, 13 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 145 (1980).
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impediment was eventually removed for panel establishment, but remained
for adoption of reports. Losing Parties often acquiesced to adoption because of international pressure and a need to preserve the GATT as a
whole. However, many reports were never adopted as losing Parties could
withhold their consent; thus blocking adoption. There were also complaints about the time it took to arrive at a panel report and the implementation of reports. The general dissatisfaction with the GATT (1947)
dispute resolution14mechanism was one of the incentives for launching the
Uruguay Round.'
The myriad of complaints and frustrations about the GATT (1947)
dispute resolution mechanism included: a long and unproductive consultative phase; barriers to the establishment of panels; a long panel
process; unsound panel decisions; the blocking of panel reports; and the
lack of enforcement of adopted panel reports. The GATT very often
served as more of a forum for discussion and a platform for negotiations.
The United States led the charge to a more legalistic system, as it felt a
more judicial approach would create greater certainty and U.S. rights
would be more readily enforced."'
The U.S. dissatisfaction with the mechanism led to its increasing use
of unilateral action, primarily under section 301, to achieve its trade
objectives." 6 The rest of the world denounced these actions and insisted
that disputes be solved in the multilateral forum:
Section 301's successful application by the United States induced foreign
capitals around the world to see GATT dispute settlement procedures in
a new light, as a way to discipline United States unilateralism ....
Thus, the aggressive use of section 301 ultimately created the climate of
widespread political support for the GAIT dispute settlement proposals
authored by the United States. Ironically, the United States, the chief
champion of the international rule of law, succeeded in its advocacy for
a stronger, more effective dispute settlement system, based upon the rule
of law, because the United States itself was increasingly perceived as an

"4

See Holbein & Carpentier, supra note 9, at 536; see also Ministerial Declaration

on the Uruguay Round, Sept. 20, 1986, GATT B.I.S.D. (33d Supp.) at 19, 25 (1987)
[hereinafter GAIT Ministerial Declaration]; Michael K. Young, Dispute Resolution in
the Uruguay Round: Lawyers Triumph Over Diplomats, 29 INT'L LAW. 389 (1995).
"' See Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, U.S. Trade Law and Policy Series No.
24: Dispute Resolution in the New World Trade Organization: Concerns and Net Benefits, 28 INT'L LAw. 1095, 1097 (1994).
16 See id. at 1100-02.
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international scofflaw, acting in its7 self-interest without regard to intemational law, rules, or agreements."

The United States had primarily been involved in GATT dispute settlement as an injured party. Frustration revolved around the procedural
barriers to the adoption and enforcement of panel reports. One of the
central U.S. negotiating objectives in the Uruguay Round was the congressionally mandated goal of improved dispute settlement." 8 The U.S.
demand for stronger enforcement was based on a "deeply rooted sort of
self-righteousness."' 1 9
Even before the changes of the Uruguay Round, the increased use of
the GAT" (1947) dispute resolution mechanism was paralleled by an
attendant judicialization of the procedures."2 The judicialization continued as the Uruguay Round made GATT dispute resolution far more
adjudicatory and legalistic.' 2 ' GATT increased countries' economic interdependence, causing people and industries to have a more direct stake in
international trade. Interdependence, in turn, led to more widespread
public scrutiny of GATT dispute resolution. As the audience broadened,
results were measured against the only yardstick people had for comparison: national courts. This led to the desire for a more judicialized
mechanism.
A. Improvements to GATT

The Uruguay Round made fundamental changes to the GATT (1947)
dispute resolution mechanism by moving towards a more judicial approach. The changes included the automatic establishment and adoption of
panel reports."' The consensus approach was the main stumbling block
in GATT (1947). Under the WTO dispute resolution mechanism, panels
are automatically established," and their reports adopted unless there is

"11

Id. at 1101-02.

See id. at 1097
Robert E. Hudec, The Judicialization of GATT Dispute Settlement, in IN WHOSE
INTEREST? DUE PROCESS AND TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 9, 18
(Michael M. Hart & Debra P. Steger eds., (1990) [hereinafter Hudec, Judicialization of
"8

119

GAT1.
'20 See id. at 11.
21 See generally Holbein & Carpentier, supra note 9, at 536 (describing the GATI
dispute resolution procedures); GATT Ministerial Declaration, supra note 114, at 25;
Young, supra note 114, at 405.
"-See Understanding, supra note 1, art. 2(1) (giving the Dispute Settlement Body
authority to establish panels and adopt their reports).
12

Id.
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a consensus not to do so.'24 An appellate body has been created for the
appeal of panel reports, which is an entirely new apparatus in the WTO
dispute resolution mechanism."z Prior to the WTO dispute resolution
mechanism, if a Party disagreed with a panel report, its only option was
to block adoption of the report. Since panel reports can no longer be
blocked, an appeal process became necessary. If reports are not implemented in a reasonable period of time, the Dispute Settlement Body can
call for compensation or authorize the suspension of concessions."
Binding arbitration procedures are provided for if a dispute arises over the
definition of a reasonable period of time for implementation, or what
appropriate compensation or concession suspension should be."
There is no question that the changes of the Uruguay Round are a
major change in the world of international dispute resolution. The GAIT
(1947) dispute resolution mechanism has been thoroughly overhauled and
transformed into a much more judicial and reliable process."
The anti-dumping system has been criticized as being protectionist
and trade distorting. Economists believe that the focus of the system is on
the protection of industry instead of acting in the best interests of consumers. It is unlikely that the current regime will be supplanted any time
in the near future. The laws serve as a mechanism by which domestic
industries can complain and vent their frustrations.
B. Substance
As discussed, a fundamental characteristic of Chapter 19 is that it
does not directly address the anti-dumping and countervailing duty laws.
Instead, it is a mechanism which simply strives to ensure that the laws
are applied correctly. This focus is the primary difference between
NAFTA's Chapter 19 and the WTO dispute resolution mechanism.
The WTO Agreements set out certain substantive norms and obligations which must be adhered to by all Members. 29 Members are obli-

124

Id. at n.1 (stating that the "DSB shall be deemed to have decided by consensus

on a matter submitted for its consideration, if no Member, present at the meeting of
the DSB when the decision is taken, formally objects to the proposed decision").
Id. art. 17 (appellate review).
'
22 Id. art. 22 (compensation and the suspension of concessions).
22 Id. art. 21 (surveillance of implementation of recommendations and rulings).
2
It should be noted that the Round did not address the basic issue of whether the
anti-dumping regime should be replaced with a system of harmonized competition laws.
See Gastle, supra note 7, at 745.
22 See Understanding, supra note 1, art. 1 (applying the rules of the Understanding
to all Members of the WTO).
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gated to conform their anti-dumping and countervailing duty regimes to
the WTO Agreements.Y° Disputes brought to the WTO concern a
country's implementing legislation.' The issue revolves around the
allegation that a particular law of, or its application by, a Member does
not conform to the obligations it has agreed to as a Member of the WTO.
Whereas Chapter 19 is an international judicial review of national
administrative action, the WTO dispute resolution mechanism can be
compared to a constitutional court. Disputes concern whether or not
certain national actions and laws conform to the internationally agreed
upon norms. Both dispute resolution mechanisms are international, but the
WTO focuses on national substantive law and its conformance with
international substantive law, while Chapter 19 analyzes national procedure to see if it conforms with national substantive law.
Anti-dumping and countervailing duty obligations are addressed by
Articles VI and XVI of the GATT, the Agreement on the Implementation
of Article VI, and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures. These provisions are ascribed to by all Members of the WTO.
The same is true for the Understanding. This is the "constitution" to
which national anti-dumping and countervailing duty regimes must
comply. This does not mean that the laws of all countries are the same.
The WTO obligations are not very detailed, and Members are given wide
latitude in their interpretation and implementation.
C. Procedure
Unlike Chapter 19 which checks domestic procedures against domestic law, the WTO dispute resolution mechanism is a procedure which
checks domestic laws against international substantive obligations. The
Understanding seeks to resolve disputes within a rule of law approach.
Although countries are free to negotiate with each other instead of going
to the Dispute Settlement Body, the mechanism is there, and can be
resorted to whenever an aggrieved party lodges a request for the establishment of a panel.

" See GATr (1947), supra note 2, art vi (discussing anti-dumping and countervailing duties).
"' See Understanding, supra note 1, art. 1 (coverage and application) (stating that
the procedures of the Dispute Settlement Body are for disputes concerning Members
and their rights and obligations under the agreement).
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1. Panel Initiation
As a multilateral agreement between governments, the WTO does not
provide for private party involvement. Although countries may have
mechanisms by which domestic industries can initiate the procedures
which lead to a country bringing a complaint to the WTO, there is
typically a degree of political discretion involved. The Parties to a dispute
are the respective governments. WTO hearings themselves are closed, so
interested Parties are not permitted to witness the proceedings which
affect them directly.'32 This is one of the primary shortcomings of the
WTO system compared to Chapter 19. Although the WTO is an agreement between governments, ultimately private interests are the ones that
are at stake. Even when a dispute concerns subsidies provided by a
government, the beneficiary of the subsidies are private. Private parties
should be able to initiate and participate in the process. This would lead
to a greater understanding and acceptance of the system. Certain checks
could be placed on private party participation so governments could
protect national interests. At a minimum, the system should become more
open, allowing interested parties access to the proceedings.
The mechanism has maintained a preference for resolution of disputes through consultations.' Consultations must be requested before a
request for a panel can be made. 4 Article 6 of the Understanding states
that if a complaining Party requests the establishment of a panel, it shall
be established at the next meeting of the Dispute Settlement Body.'35
This is automatic, unless the Dispute Settlement Body decides by consensus not to establish the panel.' 36 Since the Dispute Settlement Body is
made up of all Members of the WTO, and, therefore, will include the
Party that requested the panel, this step is essentially automatic.
Another GATr (1947) stumbling block was the adoption of the
terms of reference for panels. In the WTO dispute resolution mechanism,
unless the Parties to the dispute agree on terms within twenty days from
the day the panel is established, the default terms of reference contained
in Article 7 will be adopted."

WTO dispute resolution is for the use of the Members of the WTO. Members
are the signatory countries. There is no mechanism for private parties to engage in the
3

dispute settlement process.
' See Understanding, supra note 1, art. 4 (describing the consultation process).
'

Id. art. 4(3).
Id. art. 6(1).

'

Id.

'34

'" Id. art. 7 (listing the terms of reference of panels).
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2. Time
The GATT (1947) process was prone to significant delays and had
no firm deadlines for the completion of dispute settlements. Article 20 of
the Understanding stipulates that the Dispute Settlement Body shall
consider the panel or Appellate Body report for adoption within nine
months of the establishment of a panel, and within twelve months if there
is an appeal.' There are some mechanisms for the extension of this
time frame when the Appellate Body or panel agrees to it,139 but the
mechanism inexorably leads to a conclusion within a relatively short
period of time. The ability of any one Party to extend the time beyond
the nine or twelve-month period is extremely limited. This time period is
in addition to the two-month consultation period that precedes the request
for a panel." 4
The WTO dispute resolution mechanism process can take up to two
or three months longer than the Chapter 19 mechanism. The extension of
the Extraordinary Challenge Committee time frame from thirty to ninety
days makes that process now equal to the time allowed for a WTO
appeal. Whereas it is likely that the WTO Appellate Body will be frequently resorted to as losers generally avail themselves of their right to
appeal, in contrast, the Extraordinary Challenge Committee was used only
three times under the Free Trade Agreement, and not at all thus far under
NAFTA. The NAFTA remand procedure is the Chapter 19 fault with
respect to time. The remand process can add several months to the time
it takes to complete Chapter 19 disputes, thus negating much of the
apparent time advantage Chapter 19 has over the WTO dispute resolution
mechanism.
3. Panel Composition
a. Panels
Article 8 of the Understanding sets out the procedures for the
composition of WTO panels.'' Panels are composed of three members
chosen from various rosters. 42 Members may suggest individuals for

Id. art. 20.
Id.
" Id. (stating that the applicable nine or twelve-month period begins at the time the
Dispute Settlement Body establishes a panel).
,' Id. art. 8 (describing panel composition).
'

139

142

Id. art. 8(5).
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inclusion on the lists. 43 Panelists can be governmental or non-governmental individuals, but they are to serve in their capacity as independent
persons.1" Citizens of the countries which are party to the dispute are
precluded from serving, unless the Parties agree otherwise. 4 The Secretariat proposes panelists," and if the Parties cannot agree, the DirectorGeneral can appoint the appropriate panelists. 47
One of the inherent benefits of the WTO dispute resolution mechanism is its isolation from charges of nationalism. Since it will be extremely rare for citizens of disputants to sit on panels, and even then only
with the agreement of both Parties, charges of national bias should be
rare.
However, the process is not entirely free from charges of bias.
Simply because a panelist is from a neutral country does not mean that
a bias may not exist. For example, because of the prominence of the
United States, the European Union, and Japan in international trade and
disputes, panelists may have prejudicial feelings with respect to them.
This sort of bias is difficult to avoid altogether except by choosing
panelists known for their objectivity and lack of bias. As of yet, there
have been no significant issues of bias with GATT (1947) or WTO
disputes other than systemic complaints about the disposition of the
institution as a whole. In addition, there are other potential biases created
by the friction between developed and developing countries. Article 8(10)
states that if a developing country is a Party to a dispute, it can request
that at least one of the panel members be from a developing country.'"
b. Appellate Body
The establishment of a standing appellate body is perhaps the most
definitive move of the Uruguay Round in the direction of legalism. 49 It
is a tremendous step considering that under the GATT (1947) dispute
resolution mechanism the only option a Party had if it disagreed with a

,43 Id. art. 8(4).
14

Id. art. 8(1).

I- Id. art. 8(3).
'4

Id. art. 8(6).

, Id. art. 8(7).
' Id. art. 8(10); see also id. art. 22(8) (stating that "if the case is one brought by
a developing country Member, in considering what appropriate action might be taken,
the Dispute Settlement Body shall take into account not only trade coverage of
measures complained of, but also their impact on the economy of developing country

Members concerned").
141 See

Young, supra note 114, at 403.
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panel report was to withhold consent for adoption. This was obviously
not a satisfactory way to settle disputes, and it caused problems for all
Parties concerned.
Article 17 of the Understanding establishes the Appellate Body as
part of the WTO dispute resolution mechanism and contains provisions
with respect to panelists. 5 ' The Body is composed of seven individuals,
three of whom will serve on any one case.' Who serves on what case
is determined by rotation.' Panelists should be of "recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, international trade," and the
subject matter of the WTO Agreements. The Body should be broadly
representative of the WTO membership as a whole."5 Panelists serve
four-year terms.'55
The permanent nature of the Body, particularly the continuity of
panelists, could have a profound influence. This is the first time that
panelists deciding WTO issues will sit on multiple cases over a long
period time. Under GATr (1947) all panelists were appointed on an ad
hoc basis. The WTO innovation could result in a degree of consistency
of results and the development of a WTO jurisprudence.
4. Standard of Review
a. Panels
The standard of review is significant in international dispute resolution mechanisms as it determines the point at which international panels
will respect national government determinations."" There is an inherent
tension in dispute resolution mechanisms between the freedom and
sovereignty of governments and the gains of international cooperation."
There is a danger in international trade that governments will act as the
protagonists in the "prisoner's dilemma." That is, although all parties can
benefit the most by acting in the best interests of the group, the uncertainty of these benefits makes the desired conduct unlikely. Parties are
more apt to act in their own self-interest, as this appears to yield tangible
and certain results.
"5 See Understanding, supra note 1, art. 17 (describing the standing appellate body).
151Id. art. 17(6).
152 Id. art. 17(1).
13 Id. art. 17(3).
154

Id.

1- Id. art. 17(2).

See Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of
Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 193, 194 (1996).
'37 See id. at 211.
15
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An effective dispute resolution mechanism serves to coerce Parties
into acting for the greater good by limiting the interpretations that Parties
can put on their agreements.' Left on their own, Parties may act selfishly, and use broad interpretations of the WTO Agreements to circumvent and erect trade barriers in order to gain an advantage over other
Parties. This risk of multiple interpretations may ultimately threaten the
system of reciprocity upon which the WTO is based."
The Uruguay Round negotiations were affected by the feeling of
many Parties that GATT (1947) panels had been too intrusive in overturning national agency determinations." For this reason, the negotiators
sought to limit the extent of panel scrutiny.
The standard of review for WTO panels is set out in Article 17.6 of
the Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI:
(i) in its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall determine
whether the authorities' establishment of the facts was proper and
whether their evaluation of those facts was unbiased and objective. If
the establishment of the facts was proper and the evaluation was unbiased and objective, even though the panel might have reached a different conclusion, the evaluation shall not be overturned;
(ii) the panel shall interpret the relevant provisions of the Agreement in
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international
law. Where the panel finds that a relevant provision of the Agreement
admits of more than one permissible interpretation, the panel shall find
the authorities' measure to be in conformity with the Agreement if it
rests upon one of those permissible interpretations.6'
The standard in Article 17.6 will only apply to anti-dumping actions.
After three years, the Parties will turn to the issue of whether the standard is generally applicable to the rest of the Agreement.
This standard is new, and time will tell whether its application will
diverge from previous GATT practice. On its face, the standard appears
to require significant deference to administrative agencies by making the
role of panels one of judicial review. The first part of the standard deals
with factual determinations. It establishes a very deferential standard. This
makes sense in light of the fact that panels "lack many fact gathering
' See id. at 209.

9 See id. at 210.

0 See id. at 195.
Decisions and Declarations Relating to the Agreement on the Implementation of
Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 33 LL.M. 1125 (1994)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter Implementation of Article VI].
,62
See Croley & Jackson, supra note 156, at 198.
16
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resources, [and] are ill positioned to second-guess a party's factual
'
determinations."163
Article 17.6(ii) concerns how Parties interpret their obligations under
the Agreement and establishes a two-step process.'" The first step is the
determination of whether a provision "admits of more than one permissible interpretation, . . ."" Therefore, if a panel finds a provision to be
only permissibly interpreted in one way, the national measure must
conform to that interpretation. Only when there is a degree of ambiguity
with respect to the interpretation will the second part of the process be
engaged." The question thus becomes, what sort of ambiguity will be
necessary to compel proceeding to the second part of the test? Since the
decision about whether a provision admits of more than one permissible
interpretation is in the hands of the panel, the result of this standard may
be an unintended shift of power to the panels. 67 At least one critic
points out that panels will have to balance the interests which are involved." Since the entire system ultimately rests on voluntary compliance, panels should be cautious about being activist. However, they
must also protect the system from abuse, and so should not allow any
undermining of the WTO rules.'69
Depending on the actions of panels, the standard may pose a barrier
to the development of a WTO jurisprudence. Members have had wide
latitude in the implementation of their WTO obligations. This standard
was intended to allow that practice to persist. Therefore, two countries
could have very different provisions aiming to satisfy the same WTO
obligation, and panels will not have to choose what the correct interpretation is as long as both are permissible. The panels have been entrusted
with a precarious balancing act, and we must wait to see if they succeed.
b. Appellate Body
The Appellate Body is limited to examining issues of law and
developed legal interpretations covered in the panel reports under review."' However, since the standard of review is itself an issue of law,

163
4
1

Id. at 208.
See Implementation of Article VI, supra note 161, art. 17.6.
Croley & Jackson, supra note 156, at 198.

66

See id. at 200.

167

See id. at 205.

"6 See generally id. at 212.
169

See id.

See Understanding, supra note 1, art. 17(6) (stating that "[aln appeal shall be
limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretation developed
70
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the Appellate
Body may also get its chance to try to properly balance the
7
interests.1 '

D. Enforcement

The enforcement provisions of the WTO dispute resolution mechanism have also taken a significant step towards judicialization as compared to the GATT (1947) approach. The requirement of consensus for
adoption of panel reports and the GATT (1947) emphasis on negotiated
settlements meant that panel reports, including those adopted, were often
used simply as a platform for discussion, instead of being used as binding
decisions which compelled compliance."

1. Surveillance of Implementation
If a panel or Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent
with a covered Agreement, it is required to recommend that the Member
bring the measure into conformity." The withdrawal of inconsistent
measures is the first objective of the WTO dispute resolution mechanism.
Reports are automatically adopted within sixty days of their circulation to
the Dispute Settlement Body. 4 Article 21 of the Understanding addresses the surveillance and implementation of panel reports.7 s Within thirty
days of adoption, the Member is required to inform the Dispute Settlement Body of its implementation intentions. 7 A reasonable period of
time is allowed for implementation." What constitutes a reasonable
period of time is subject to binding arbitration if there is a dispute."7
If the winning party is not satisfied with the compliance measures of the
loser it can withdraw concessions.' The issue of the level of concessions to be withdrawn can also be forced to binding arbitration."is This
entire process represents a shift towards a more judicial panel process and

by the panel').
...
See Croley & Jackson, supra note 156, at 195.
'7 See Young, supra note 114, at 402-03.
'r See Understanding, supra note 1, art. 19(1).
IId. art. 16(4).
Id. at art. 21 (regarding surveillance of implementation of recommendations and
I~
rulings).
176 Id. art. 21(3).
17
Id.
'7 Id. art. 21(3)(c).
Id. art. 22 (describing compensation and suspension of concessions).
'

Id. art. 22(6).
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a "shift in influence from the Contracting Parties to the panels and the
Appellate Body."''
2. International Obligations
As international agreements create binding international obligations,
WTO panel reports adopted pursuant to the Understanding represent
binding obligations in international law. The first problem with enforcing
these obligations is that international law lacks coercive enforcement
power.182 However, a sense of comity and obligation often result in a
country's obeyance of international obligations.
The threat of lack of compliance stands in the background of WTO
disputes. As this is a new system, and is far more binding than the
GATT (1947) dispute resolution mechanism, it remains to be seen how
willing countries are to comply with panel reports. If countries are
dissatisfied with the way the WTO dispute resolution mechanism works,
they may become less willing to acquiesce when they feel wronged.
All eyes initially turned on the United States as it lost the first WTO
case. United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline concerned U.S. gasoline regulations and their application to
Venezuela." The United States lost the case on appeal. It appears that
the ruling will be implemented by the United States given the stake it has
in the WTO as a whole, and its responsibility as a leader to set an
example for others.
In passing the WTO implementing legislation, a compromise was
struck with Senator Dole to get his support for the bill. According to the
compromise, the WTO Dispute Settlement Review Commission is to be
established.' Sitting appellate judges would be appointed to review
WTO dispute resolution mechanism decisions when the United States
loses. 85 They will be there to ensure that the panel adhered to the
proper standard of review and did not exceed its authority." 6 If three
decisions are found to be erroneous, any member of Congress can bring
a privileged resolution, calling for the renegotiation of WTO dispute
resolution mechanism rules or the withdrawal of the United States from

"' Young, supra note 114, at 402-03.
"82

See Hudec, Judicialization of GATT, supra note 119, at 20.

" United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline Appellate
Body, May 20, 1996, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Gttwto File.
See Gastle & Castle, supra note 16, at 893-94.
185 See id.
"8 See id.
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the WTO.'" It has been argued that this could have a chilling effect on
panels, but it is just as likely that it will lend credibility to the mechanism.
3. Retaliation
Although it is an option, retaliation has only been authorized once in
the history of the GATT, and it was not used in that instance.'1 The
problem with a withdrawal of concessions is that it often results in
equivalent harm to the country withdrawing the concession. Consumers of
the sanctioned imports are adversely affected, thus causing as much harm
in the sanctioning country as in the target country. 9 Retaliation can
also be a useless measure when the size of the countries is disparate. If
the targeted country is much larger than the aggrieved country, the threat
of retaliation may be insignificant. 9°
Other than the fact that panel reports create binding international
obligations and that aggrieved Parties can retaliate almost automatically,
the WTO dispute resolution mechanism has no method to force compliance except by moral and political persuasion. It remains to be seen how
countries will react to their obligations which emanate from the Dispute
Settlement Body. WTO dispute resolution mechanism panels cannot create
new obligations, but their decisions about what a country's obligations are
will be a point of contention.
E. WTO Analysis and Conclusions
Since the WTO dispute resolution mechanism is new, it is difficult
to evaluate how it has functioned, or to even make accurate predictions
about how it will function. We only have the text of the Understanding
and a few cases to evaluate, and must walt longer before actual practice
can be accurately evaluated. Until then, all is supposition.
What seems plain is that the process will be more unified and
adjudicatory.' The procedures are clear and automatic. Parties will no
longer be able to stonewall the process. Whether panel reports will be
properly implemented remains to be seen, but there will be adopted panel
reports and clear statements about the action which is required to conform
with WTO obligations.

id.
See Bello & Holmer, supra note 115, at 1103.

1,7 See
's

,s' See id.
'~ See Young, supra note 114, at 408.
...See id. at 405.
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The WTO dispute resolution mechanism provides a forum in which
a country's laws can be challenged. Although the substance of the law
cannot be changed by the WTO, panels can determine if a country has
properly interpreted and implemented its laws according to WTO norms.
Any further change to the existing trade law regime must come from
multilateral and bilateral negotiations.
One of the chief Canadian concerns before the Uruguay Round was
U.S. unilateral action and its ability to force its will on other countries by
virtue of its power and position in the trade realm. The United States
achieved many of its goals in the Uruguay Round. For example, the
WTO now covers intellectual property and there are requirements for
adequate enforcement." This, coupled with the WTO dispute resolution
mechanism should lead to a diminution of U.S. unilateral action. The
WTO dispute resolution mechanism's automatic process of authorizing
retaliation will lead to a "more informed cost-benefit analysis of protectionist actions generally. '""r
IV. FINAL ANALYSIS, COMPARISONS & CONCLUSIONS

As stated at the outset, the issue is not the choice of one of these
two mechanisms over the other. What needs to be considered is how best
to operate in a reality where both exist and to use them both effectively.
After the advent of the Free Trade Agreement and before the Uruguay
Round, there were very few anti-dumping and countervailing duty disputes brought to the GATT (1947). Chapter 19 provided a dispute resolution mechanism which could act as a check on the politicized national
agency processes. The bilateral mechanism has been widely used, and
from the standpoint of Canada, has generally been successful at lowering
non-tariff barriers. There is no reason why this approach should be
abandoned.
However, the shortcoming of Chapter 19 is its failure to address the
underlying problem of the trade laws themselves. The WTO dispute
resolution mechanism can more directly address this issue. With the
procedural certainty of the new mechanism, it should be tested as a forum
for addressing complaints about U.S. implementation of WTO obligations.
The more comprehensive due process guarantees of the WTO make it
unadvisable for Canada to "rely exclusively on the remedies provided by
Chapter 19."'

" See Understanding, supra note 1, art. 22(3)(f)(iii) (applying concessions to
intellectual property).
"9 Bello & Holmer, supra note 115, at 1103.
194 Gastle & Castel, supra note 16, at 895.
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The WTO dispute resolution mechanism also has an advantage over
Chapter 19 because its resolutions are more permanent. Chapter 19
actions are isolated, and do not preclude future protective trade actions
concerning the same products from being launched again. The WTO
dispute resolution mechanism addresses this concern by requiring that
underlying legal measures be changed.
The WTO, by virtue of its multilateral nature, is an institutional
behemoth. In contrast, the implementation of NAFMA is primarily left to
the parties themselves. This creates a totally different dynamic for disputes that is contingent on the forum. NAFTA disputes will generally
revolve around discussions between senior officials. Even the Chapter 19
process can be affected by this dynamic as was seen in the Softwood
Lumber dispute. At the WTO, although consultations are encouraged, the
dispute resolution mechanism is more adjudicatory and puts the parties in
the position of opposing litigants.
A Hobson's choice is one where there is no real alternative given.
These dispute resolution mechanisms have fundamental differences which
preclude the issue from being one of a simple choice. Canada and
Canadian industries should choose to use both avenues. Chapter 19 has
proven to be a beneficial option for Canada, and the WTO dispute
resolution mechanism's new reliance on the international rule of law
makes that mechanism more attractive as a way to challenge the laws of
the United States.

